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MOVING FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO POLITICAL
ADVOCACY IN THE HUMAN SERVICES--HOW TO
ORGANIZE A SUCCESSFUL STATEWIDE
POLITICAL EFFORT IN YOUTH SERVICES *
MILAN J. DLUHY, Ph.D.
School of Social Work
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ABSTRACT
The current funding environment makes
political advocacy on the part of social work
professionals mandatory. The social work lit-
erature on political advocacy is reviewed and
categorized into schools of thought. The
major portion of the paper, however, presents
and then analyzes a case study of a statewide
youth services association in order to gain
more insight into how professional social
workers can develop and use more successful
political strategies and tactics.
Historically the social work profession
has had a love-hate relationship with politics
(Alexander, 1982). On the one hand, the
profession has been committed to improving
direct practice and the development of pro-
fessional standards. On the other hand, many
have argued that the profession should also
play a far more visible and political role
-654-
within its communities and society (e.g.,
Dean, 1977, and Stewart, 1981). When the econ-
omy is expanding rapidly, human services may
be able to get their fair share but during
periods of slow growth or stagnation they are
prime targets for curtailment (Barbaro, 1978).
It will be argued that given the current
funding environment, political neutrality or
ambivalence toward political activity on the
part of social work professionals can only
mean more negative consequences for the con-
temporary victims of social and economic
problems. In this context, as Brager has
eloquently stated elsewhere, professional
social workers must function as advocates for
clients and advocacy requires political
behavior (Brager, 1968).
To gain insight into what social work has
to say about political strategies and tactics
that professionals can use, the literature is
reviewed and categorized into schools of
thought, and these schools are evaluated in
terms of how they can help facilitate our
understanding of political advocacy. The
major portion of this paper, however, presents
and analyzes a case study of a statewide youth
services association which was highly
successful in achieving its policy objectives.
many of the lessons learned from analyzing
this case replicate the empirical findings in
the social work literature, but a few of the
lessons, which are currently not found in the
literature, offer clear evidence on how to
manage the internal operations of a statewide
association. In this respect, the case study
serves as a model for other statewide pro-
fessional associations which seek to further
the interests of their client population. (1)
During 1981 and 1982, the author served
as a workshop leader for this association.
Approximately three weeks were spent in the
state over the course of these two years.
Besides running a week long workshop for the
membership each year, the author reviewed:
all the minutes of the association for the
past five years; the state budget; and the
legislative record. Informal interviews with
35 of the 48 members of the association were
also held. Given the confidential nature of
these interviews, the actual name of the state
is withheld. The interviews included ques-
tions about issues, conflicts within the
association, assessments of power and influ-
ence among the membership, and detailed
accounts of the strategies and tactics used by
the association. Even though a pre-designed
case study format did not guide this research,
every attempt is made in the following pages
to present a factually accurate and carefully
analyzed account of the activities and in-
ternal workings of this association over the
course of two years. A strict neutral ob-
server role was followed whenever possible.
The Current Funding Environment
The environment of new scarcity produces
among other things organizational instability
and uncertainty, reductions in personnel, and
service reductions or losses in the quality of
services (Hasenfeld, 1983). For example, a
survey of twenty-two runaway youth programs in
Michigan in 1982 indicated that 94.2% of the
programs had experienced budget cuts in the
last two years and that of these, 70% had been
cut by 15% or more. (2) Additionally, 82.4%
of the programs were engaged in major reorg-
anization of their services and personnel,
35.3% indicated cutbacks in services, and
58.8% reported that they had laid off
personnel. The scenario represented by the
results of this survey is most certainly wide-
spread across the country when one looks at
what has been happening for the past few years
in terms of the availability of resources for
human services. In perhaps the most thorough
analysis to date, the Urban Institute detailed
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the actual and proposed spending cuts for four
years at the national level (Salamon and
Abramson, 1982). Their findings indicate that
the federal government is reducing its own
activities in fields where the nonprofit
organizations were active by $115 billion
between FY 1982 and FY 1985 (Salamon and
Abramson, 1982, p. xvii). More telling, how-
ever is that the nonprofit sector would have
to increase its rate of giving anywhere from
10 to 12 times what it has been at its peak,
if the gap left by federal cut-backs is to be
filled (Salamon and Abramson, 1982, p. 60).
The hardest hit areas by federal cutbacks are
social service, community development, employ-
ment and training, and health care service
programs (opposed to health care financing
programs).It is unrealistic to expect the
nonprofit sector, states, or localities to
pick up the slack (Dluhy, 1982). In short,
the current funding environment is strained
and it may be that way for a number of years.
Given fewer resources in the human services,
there is likely to be continuous conflict over
priorities and needs which translates into
reductions in services to clients, cuts in
unpopular services and programs, and the
underallocation of resources for needy but
unorganized clients.
Another critical aspect of the funding
environment is that while the federal govern-
ment is severely cutting back its financial
support for the human services, it is as the
same time returning more of the responsibility
for setting funding priorities to the states
and localities without giving them additional
revenues to pay for these services. In the
past two years, the Regan administration has
been instrumental in either the adoption or
proposal of sixteen block grants which
consolidate 103 different categorical programs
(Dluhy, 1982). Block grants by design and
purpose shift more of the responsibility for
allocating resources to the state and local
level. The issue here is that a new system of
allocation is becoming more critical than the
highly centralized and categorical one of the
past. The states and localities will increas-
ingly set the standards and rules for
distributing the diminished federal fiscal
resources. If economic conditions had been
more normal, it might have been possible to
decentralize program responsibility to the
functional areas covered by the block grants.
State and local administrators would then have
been able to maintain existing service levels
while also being able to respond to new
priorities and needs. However, without
constant funding, state and local admini-
strators will have little relief from the pain
of denying and cutting back services as
overall funding is reduced still further.
In sum, with perhaps a few exceptions,
the prospects are poor that either the
nonprofit sector or the state and localities
will be able to pick up very much of the slack
left by the federal budget cuts. Politically,
the block grant in conjunction with funding
cuts can only mean more conflict at the state
and local level which, in turn, will mean that
these arenas will increasingly become the
dominant place for debates over priorities and
needs in the human services. As such, state-
wide political advocacy will become even more
critical as time goes on. The implication is
that we need to recognize and accept these
shifts in the funding environment and begin to
develop well organized statewide advocacy
efforts to shape decisions in these arenas.
Without more political advocacy on the part of
professionals, the cuts could be even deeper
and, thus, further reinforce those who are
seeking to dismantle the support systems that
have taken fifty years to assemble (Stewart,
1981, p. 271).
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One place to turn for direction in
developing political strategies and tactics is
the professional literature. But, as Sosin
points out, literature based on research in
social work is anything but rich and diverse
on this subject (Sosin, 1983). For purposes
of discussion, the existing literature is
organized into three different categories and
each category is evaluated briefly as to its
utility. (3) However, given the dearth of
literature in this area generally, profess-
ionals seeking to engage in serious political
advocacy must be prepared to look closely at
other professions and their approaches or
learn through trial and error.
The first category of literature in
social work is labelled the Admonition School
of Thought. These writers, for the most part,
remind the profession of its history and
commitment to the social and economic problems
of its clients (e.g., Alexander, 1982;
Barbaro, 1978; Brager, 1968; Cohen, 1966;
Dean, 1977; Levey, 1970; and Stewart, 1981).
For those labelled as the Admonition School,
there is little or no incompatibility between
practicing clinically and advocating for the
client in a political sense (Briar and Briar,
1982). Stewart's (1981) recent plea for
political action captures the essence of this
School of Thought:
In my view, social work loses its
reason for being if it gives up its
basic, traditional values and philo-
sophical commitments. It will lose
its professional uniqueness. Social
work education then becomes primarily
technical training with no more claim
to social work positions than other
trainees who are technically prepared
and possess clinical, planning, or
administrative skills (p. 272).
The important contribution of this School
of Thought is that it constantly reminds the
profession of its historical mission and
ideology. The "call to arms" needs to be peri-
odically made, but beyond this, there is
little by way of practical advice as to how
professionals can become more effective and
how research findings, in particular, can be
used to develop more successful strategies or
tactics. In the context of developing a
statewide political effort, the leadership, at
a minimum must be prepared to admonish its
membership and raise its level of political
consciousness. This School of Thought pro-
vides the ideological rationale for political
involvement.
A second category is referred to as the
Arsenal or Tactical School of Thought. While
these writers also admonish the profession,
they focus more heavily on what should be done
and how to do it (e.g., Mahaffey, 1972;
Sharwell, 1982; Thursz, 1971; Thursz, 1977;
and Zweig, 1969). Most of the writing in this
area, however, appears to be highly anecdotal
rather than the result of rigorous research or
the result of carefully described and analyzed
case studies. Thus, comments about what
things go into making an effective lobbyist,
how to prepare and deliver successful testi-
mony, and the steps necessary to develop
comprehensive political strategies are pre-
sented to the professional as practical
advice. The utility of the Arsenal or
Tactical School is that it leads the way by
illustrating how professionals can becone
involved and what kinds of things they can do.
Its major limitation is that it offers advice
that is not specific enough to the political
situation or circumstances in which profess-
ionals may find themselves. At the worst, the
professional may waste a lot of time on
activities that are either meaningless or
aimed at the wrong people or targets of
influence. At best, the professional may
raise his/her sense of political efficacy and
be encouraged to broaden his/her involvement
in the political process. Without a more
careful assessment based on research, the
professional is still left in many situations
with little else than trial and error as a
guide. As discussed elsewhere, without better
knowledge of strategies and tactics and their
probable impacts, professionals behave more
like "fire-fighters" than like "pragmatic
brokers" who know how to use their resources
efficiently and effectively (Dluhy, 1981).
Recent research on the political involvement
of professionals sheds some light on the
general observation that social work profess-
ionals are fairly ineffective in the political
process (Wolk, 1981; Mathews, 1982). While
these studies find that the level of political
activity is higher among social that the
general population and similar to other types
of professions, these high levels of activity
do not guarantee political influence or
legislative effectiveness. One interpretation
of these findings is that influence and
effectiveness are much more a product of the
use of adroit strategies and tactics than the
result of any overall level of political
activity engaged in by professionals. As both
Epstein (1968) and Rothman (1974) point out,
social workers are far more comfortable with
conventional professional roles like expert
testimony, writing letters, and signing peti-
tions than they are with more radical roles
which might involve some kind of protest. Or
as Wolk (1981, p. 287) documents, social
workers are more likely to discuss issues,
join organizations with political objectives,
and write letters than they are to: attend
political meetings; get involved in political
campaigns; or make monetary contributions to
candidates or parties. In short, political
activity, per se, does not guarantee success.
What is needed is a more careful and rigorous
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assessment of which strategies and tactics to
use.
The third category of writers is labelled
as the Outcome School of Thought. This body
of knowledge draws upon either carefully
reported case studies or other types or
research to establish more concretely the
linkages between strategies, tactics, and
outcomes. The recent literature in this area
is the most helpful because it not only is
suggestive of the kinds of strategies and
tactics that can be used, but it also focuses
on which types to use under differing condi-
tions. As the dialogue among professionals
continues, the critical questions that remain
are--who is responsible for deciding what is
to be advocated, what level of advocacy is
appropriate, and what strategies of influence
will be adopted? These questions cannot be
answered confidently without a careful
assessment of what has worked and what has
failed in other situations. The Outcome
School of Thought using research findings
suggests the following generalizations about
what kinds of factors lead to successful
outcomes. (4)
1. Successful legislative strategy is
contingent primarily upon the proper timing,
the building of a coalition of support ahead
of time, the offering of mainly incremental
and feasible solutions, and the ability to
maintain the visibility of issues over time
(Dear and Patti, 1981).
2. Professional organizations that are
highly successful in both the legislative and
bureaucratic arenas have the following
characteristics: They have a small leadership
group which decides on and implements strategy
in the name of the larger group; they have an
effective communication network within the
member ship; and they have some kind of
professional staff and/or skilled lobbyists
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representing them (e.g., Abrams and Goldstein,
1982; Dempsey, 1982; and Whitaker, 1982).
3. Those representing the professional
organization are most successful when they use
tactics which build up their credibility and
reputation over time. Some of the more impor-
ant tactics are; interacting frequently and
regularly with legislators and bureaucrats;
supplying legislators and bureaucrats with
much needed technical and political infor-
ation; and carefully monitoring the day to day
activities of the policy development and
implementation process (e.g., Bell and Bell,
1982; Mathews, 1982; Smith, 1979; and Wolk,
1981).
4. Finally, when making their case,
those representing professional organizations
are more successful when they portray the
client groups they work with in the least
stigmatized way, when they demonstrate that
the programs they use to help these client
groups are cost effective and efficient, and
when they mobilize the geographic constituency
of the elected representative (e.g., How,
1978; Humphreys, 1978; Rothman, 1974; and
Smith, 1979).
Taken together, these generalizations
about strategies, tactics, and outcomes offer
more definitive and clear advice to potential
political advocates than either the Admonition
or Arsenal/Tactical School of Thought. While
each school of thought performs a function for
the larger social work profession, the Outcome
School is definitely the most promising and
has the most utility at this time.
Theof-a Statewide Youth.Services
Association
The association represents 48 different
youth service agencies. Most of these are
nonprofit agencies which provide some com-
bination of residential treatment, coun-
selling, and advocacy services for youth in
the state. The association is an organization
which performed primarily educational and
social functions for its membership up until
two years ago. While it met quarterly and
published an annual report, the association
rarely, if ever, entered the political thic-
ket. While some of its members occasionally
lobbied behind the scenes for particular
causes, the association was not in the habit
of doing things like taking formal political
positions, organizing lobbying campaigns, or
even courting influential politicians or
bureaucrats. This organization was one with
an extremely low level of political con-
sciousness and activity. Most members seemed
more concerned with the professional image of
the association and what they could do to
enhance that image. A review of the minutes
for the association (1975-1980) confirmed the
observation that it was primarily concerned
with professional issues of practice, the
licensing and certification of service
workers, and the upgrading of training for its
membership.
Until 1980, the legal and funding
environment for youth services in the state
appeared stable. Few changes had been made in
the laws governing youth in the state for more
than a decade and while overall funding for
youth programs remained very low during this
same period, it was at least constant (with
the normal inflationary increases each year).
Under these circumstances, the membership of
the association seemed content to pursue
issues of professional practice.
Two important events transpired during
1980 and 1981 which influenced a few in the
association to pursue a far more active pol-
itical agenda. First, the long standing
Director of the State Department of Human
Services (which had jurisdiction over youth
services) indicated his wish to retire. His
"iron grip" over the social services budget
for the past twenty years was now going to
come to an end and a few of the members of the
association felt that the legislature and the
career bureaucracy would now have more of a
chance to influence priorities and resource
allocation than ever before. Secondly, the
first round of federal budget cuts was now
being felt at the state level and the uncer-
tainty as to whether youth services would be
able to maintain its previous budget alloc-
ations was real. While the state had survived
quite nicely the economic slumps of the
1970's, by 1981 the state's cash flow and
unemployment rate had become a very serious
problem. The state budget surplus was gone by
1980 and the drain on the state budget created
by the higher unemployment rate put the state
in a budget cutting mood. These factors
created an opportunity to upgrade youth
services in the state, but the real mood of
the association seemed to be more one of how
to survive over the next few years rather than
how to expand the domain of youth services.
The first strategy used by the activist
members in 1981 was to actively politicize the
membership. An outside consultant was hired
to provide a week long workshop on political
advocacy which was attended by 90% of the
members. After the workshop was completed, an
advocacy strategy committee was appointed by
the president of the association to develop a
comprehensive political strategy. While there
was substantial resistance to offering the
workshop and setting up the advocacy
committee, the activists were able to convince
enough of the membership that it was at least
worth a try. This resistance was overcome in
the following ways. The activists consisted
of five social orkers who had been with the
association since its beginning (three of whom
had served as president of the association).
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They were by reputation and experience leaders
in the field of youth services in the state.
They also had previous political experience
and were not shy about political involvement.
Most importantly, however, was the fact that
they were respected by the full membership.
This respect and admiration allowed them to
successfully admonish the membership by
appealing to them in both the formal meetings
as well as informally through individual
conversations. Thus, the activists raised
the consciousness level of the membership but
left the development of the detailed action
plan to the advocacy strategy committee.
Within eighteen months the advocacy committee
not only developed but successfully implemen-
ted a broad plan of action. While the comm-
ittee could not take all of the credit for
changes in the youth services field in the
state, they certainly provided the impetus for
and the facilitation of what later occurred.
(5) At the end of 1982, the funding of youth
services had been increased by 42.1% over the
previous budget year, the first time funding
had increased by anything more than inflation
in the last decade. Additionally, a new Comm-
ission on Children and Youth was established
to: monitor what the state was doing in these
areas; fund experimental or pilot programs;
and improve research and knowledge- dissem-
ination on critical issues in practice. To
add icing to the cake, one of the members of
the association, who was one of the early
activists, was appointed as the executive
director of the Commission. There was also a
major review and subsequent revision of the
state statutes affecting youth and their
status in the state. Finally, he association
was successful in influencing the chairman of
the major committee handling youth issues in
the state legislature to introduce two impor-
tant pieces of legislation. Given the prev-
ious actions in youth services, the assoc-
iation had accomplished a considerable amount
in a short period of time. They had not only
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politicized their own membership, but they had
organized it in such a way that it was capable
of exerting influence in both the legislative
and bureaucratic arena at the state level.
The remainder of this paper illustrates the
approach they employed and the lessons to be
learned from this case.
The Operation of a Model Statewide Association
The advocacy strategy committee agreed
that to avoid elitism and divisive faction-
alism, membership on the committee would
change each year. Six people were initially
appointed to the committee. It was further
agreed that the committee would meet regularly
(especially during the legislative session)
and be responsible for: The action plan; the
coordination and interaction between the var-
ious work groups; and overall quality control.
Quality control refers to the continuous
evaluation of how the action plan was working.
So as to not overburden the committee, tasks
such as- the planning of specific events,
writing position papers or testimony, and
mobilizing the membership when necessary were
left to other work groups. This allowed the
committee to concentrate on the action plan
and its implementation. In practice, the
group was small enough to meet frequently (at
least once a week) and coincidentally operate
largely through a consensus of opinion. The
fact that the members of the committee were
all within a reasonable driving distance of
the state capitol made the regular meeting
schedule possible. Members of the association
from more remote areas of the state were
encouraged to join work groups which did not
require frequent face to face meetings.
Further, it was agreed (by the full member-
ship) that on major issues or pieces of
legislation, the entire membership would vote
on a formal resolution taking a position.
Beyond this, the membership delegated
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authority to the committee to pian ana oversee
the advocacy effort.
The president of the association, with
the advice of the advocacy committee, also
formed six ad hoc work groups (see Figure 1).
These work groups were given specific tasks to
perform and asked to report on a regular basis
to the advocacy committee. Meeting times were
left to the work groups and when their
assignments were completed, they went out of
existence. the goal was to have every member
of the organization on at least one work
group. This not only broadened participation,
but it minimized the notion of "elitism" or
domination by a handful of the membership. As
it turned out, this approach allowed the
membership to buy into the advocacy effort
even if they did nothing more than make a few
calls. Brief reports from the work groups and
the advocacy committee were to be made at all
of the monthly and quarterly organizational
meetings to heighten the level of interest in
the advocacy effort. After a while, even the
most apolitical of the membership began to
take pride in the overall effort. This
experience illustrates that the socialization
(through participation) of the membership
should not be ignored in any advocacy effort.
Figure 1 identifies the principal
activities of the work groups. Given the
geography of the state, it is important to
remember that the people who lived in remote
areas and who could not meet frequently were
assigned to work groups and tasks that were
able to be done in their home areas. As a
result, many members who had never done
anything except attend the quarterly meetings,
wound up giving considerable time to the
advocacy effort. Other work groups were
developed as needed but the groups in Figure 1
were the major ones.
The agenda for the work groups appears to
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be lengthyp but the tbjective was to get
started in each of these areas and to spread
the work load across the membership. It is
critical to emphasize that the advocacy
committee oversaw the operation of each work
group and made certain that the completion of
tasks was timely and done with the utmost of
care. The association also used volunteer
undergraduate and graduate interns to perform
some of the tasks assigned to the various work
groups mentioned above. Overall, the comm-
ttee did not let the work load gravitate to
four or five people. Instead, there was
widespread membership involvement in the
advocacy effort. The evidence is that every
member was on at least one work group and some
were on as many as three. Interviews also
revealed that during the legislative session
(January-June) members spent anywhere from a
minimum of two hours a week to a maximum of
thirty hours on the advocacy effort with the
average being around six hours per week.
While the association toyed with the idea of
hiring a part-time staff person in the capitol
to manage the advocacy effort, finances did
not allow it. However, it was agreed that if
such a person were hired in the future, he/she
would be under the direction of the advocacy
committee. It was further agreed that a staff
person would never become responsible for
either the development of the action plan or
quality control. This was always to remain
with the committee. The feeling was that a
broad based and successful advocacy effort was
preferable, because it would not have to rely
heavily on a few people who might move, lose
interest, or burn out. The philosophy was
that tasks could be reassigned and leadership
rotated. With only eighteen months of active
political involvement, only time will tell
whether this philosophy can work over an
extended period of time. The notion of devel-
oping talented and experienced people through-
out the association in the advocacy area so
that the association could survive any major
membership changes with minimal effects on its
advocacy efforts is certainly laudable.
Finally, the membership earmarked $2,000
for the advocacy effort in the first year.
The money became a line item in he assoc-
iation's annual budget and this guaranteed
minimal resources for typing, mailing, post-
age, phones, etc. Without this small amount,
the advocacy effort might not have been able
to accomplish as many things as it did.
Future plans call for a separate fund raising
activity for the advocacy effort every year.
Conceptually, if we think of strategy as
the overall approach to changing things in the
youth services area and tactics as the
activities engaged in by the association to
accomplish this, some summary observations are
helpful. It is clear that the initial stra-
tegy was merely to politicize the membership
through consciousness raising tactics. After
this was accomplished, the strategy committee
agreed that its approach would be to increase
the visibility, credibility, and input of the
association into the legislative and burea-
ucratic processes at the state level. They
relied on basic tactics such as the use of an
effective communication network, the frequent
face to face interaction of members with key
influentials, supplying influentials with
technical and political information, careful
monitoring of day to day events affecting
youth, publicizing the association and the
individual member programs, holding a legis-
lative day in the capitol, and both direct (
face to face) and indirect lobbying (i.e.,
letters, telegrams, position papers). These
tactics were carried out by members of each
work group bu the overall strategy was
monitored by the advocacy committee. Given
the previous history of the association, an
initial strategy aimed at increasing visi-
bility, credibility, and input into the policy
process seemed appropriate.
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Lessons Learned and the Social Work Literature
In a two day retreat held in the fall of
1982, the membership in conjunction with the
author/workshop leader reviewed the activities
of the past eighteen months in order to assess
what worked, what did not work, and what
directions should be taken in the future.
There are two perspectives on the lessons that
were learned.
The first perspective has to do with how
the association and its members behaved in the
political arena as they exerted their influ-
ence. The second perspective focuses on the
internal management of the association as it
was engaged in these activities. Using the
first perspective, the association learned:
that it was better to pursue a legislative
agenda that was perceived of as incremental as
opposed to radical (a threat to the existing
system); that is was important to establish
organizational credibility and personal trust
in both the legislative and bureaucratic
arenas through close and frequent interaction
so that the membership and its views would be
accepted readily; that the actual tactics used
should stress the "softsell" which appealed to
decision makers' values, their sense of
rationality, and their friendship rather than
the "hardsell" which emphasized blatant
pressure and/or threats; and that wherever
possible, it was better to emphasize the long
range objectives for youth in terms of their
family situation and potential adult roles and
then to connect this to a clear-cut management
(program) approach which emphasized perform-
ance accountability and cost effective serv-
ices. In short, these lessons replicated many
of the research findings of the Outcome School
of Thought discussed earlier. Accordingly,
the social work literature which argues for
pursuing incremental change, establishing
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organizational credibility, using low key
interactional tactics, and emphasizing cost
effective and efficient programs for clients
is given more credence.
The second perspective on the asso-
ciation's experiences documents what can be
learned about the successfull management of
the internal operations of a professional
association. Since the literature is less
than instructive in this area, these lessons
deserve more explication. Together these
lessons offer some new ideas about political
advocacy.
First and foremost, resources can not be
wasted. Many people involved in the advocacy
effort willburn out easily and they do not
like to be asked to do things that are
wasteful or that do not lead to observable
payoffs. Carefully plan strategy so that
unnecessary lobbying, phone calling, letter
writing, testifying, etc., are avoided and
only activities that have clear-cut payoffs
are pursued. Also, regular feedback needs to
be given to the strategy committee so that
they know how they are doing in making
assignments. Political activity, per se, is
not enough. A lot more attention needs to go
into managing limited resources so that the
potential costs of various strategies and
tactics are always being addressed.
Second. in an advocacy effort, there is a
role for everyone. Assess talent carefully
and assign tasks appropriately. For example,
those who do not perform well in front of
large audiences or who are uncomfortable with
behind the scenes lobbying should be assigned
tasks more ompatible with their skill. The
important thing is that everyone is part of
the advocacy effort. One frequent complaint
is that a small group of the members seek to
dominate the show and do most of the work
because they are, in fact, the most political
anyway. The full membership should try to
discourage this and emphasize finding a place
for everyone. In this case, the activists got
the advocacy effort going in the first place,
but they readily shared power with other
members of the association and this allowed a
more consensual approach to internal decision
making. The positive aspects of sharing power
more widely are the heightened enthusiasm and
the increased time that will be given to the
advocacy effort by the membership.
Finally. "the problem of dirty hands" can
not be avoided in an organization. The best
policy is to deal with it directly and develop
a position on it. The most critical issue for
the association over the eighteen month was
"the problem of dirty hands" (Walzer, 1973).
Once the association formally decided to en-
gage in political activity, the question be-
came what boundaries needed o be established.
Interviews with the members revealed that no
one succeeds at politics without getting
his/her hands at least a little dirty. In a
discussion of tactics, there was little resis-
tance by members to: making phone calls to
legislators; occasionally making a personal
visit to the office of a legislator or bureau-
crat; writing a letter or telegram to a legis-
lator urging support of or opposition to a
particular piece of legislation; or even
giving expert testimony. But many members
indicated that they had considerable diffi-
culty campaigning for political candidates;
contributing money to their campaigns, holding
a fund raiser for them; and giving legislators
the names, addresses, and phone numbers of
their board members so that they could be
contacted for political purposes (also see
Wolk, 1981, p. 287, and Milbrath, 1963, pp.
213-260). These latter tactics illustrate
what the group defined as "dirty hands". The
dilemma of where to draw the line in political
activity is a common one faced by professional
organizations. Some political activity takes
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little effort and it raises few -moral or
ethical issues, while other activity may be
both time consuming as well as anxiety
provoking. It is too easy to simply argue
that the ends justify the means. The only
solution to this dilemma is to freely discuss
the issue, debate it, and where necessary,
take a position. In a workable, pragmatic
fashion the membership can formally restrict
some tactics and agree to be extremely careful
in asking people to do things that discomfort
them.
In the end, both political advocacy and
professional standards can co-exist within
professional associations. If there is an
overall lesson, it is that "the problem of
dirty hands" is unavoidable once an organ-
ization decides to enter the political arena,
and that honest discussion and debate, not
avoidance, is the best approach.
The case offers new evidence on how to
manage the internal operations of a prof-
essional association. However, the broader
message is that even though neutral prof-
essional postures are often inbred in social
work and other types of direct service
training, it only takes a little exposure to
the political process to reassure the most
reluctant that their worst fears are largely
imagined. After some initial admonishment by
the leadership, the membership got involved in
the advocacy effort and through trial and
error saw the direct results of their efforts.
This case shows, therefore, how a professional
association can move comfortably in a short
period of time to a place where political
advocacy is as important a priority as
professional standards. It also shows that
"the problem of dirty hands " can be overcome
if professionals will deal with the issue
-674-
directiy.
The earlier review of the literature
further suggests that the research based
Outcome School of Thought needs to be expanded
if we are to get better information about what
works and does not work in terms of political
strategies and tactics. Future case studies
or other research which connects strategies,
tactics, and outcomes could further our
knowledge of political advocacy in this area
by addressing some of the issues which are
raised but only partially answered in this
case study.
1. Can professional associations suc-
cessfully join broader political
coalitions in the human services
without sacrificing their indi-
vidual political clout and succ-
esses? Or should they maintain
their autonomy?
2. Over an extended period of time
how can an organization sustain
widespread involvement in a
political advocacy effort? What
incentives or techniques can be
used?
3. Can a professional association be
more successful if it hires a
rofessional lobbyist or is it
better to stick with rank and file
members as lobbyists?
4. Is it necessary for organizations
to support political candidates
financially and otherwise to be
successful or can an organization
be as effective by using simple
persuasion, its reputation, and
its visibility in the community;
and
-675-
5. Finally, are there any inherent
advantages to organizations which
use more consensual opposed to
elite models of internal decision
making? Or put in another way,
must political strategies and
tactics be handled by a few to be
successful or can there be more
widespread participation in the
design and execution of an
advocacy strategy in a prof-
essional association?
In the end, this case study shows how a
measure of commitment on the part of social
workers, a sensible organization, and a sound
political strategy can go a long way toward
improving service systems in this country. In
contrast to a perception of social workers
articulated by Form (1964, p. 89) close to
twenty years ago, there is little evidence in
this study that the profession breeds a type
that is timid, conservative, unimaginative,
and easily co-opted by the tough-minded.
NOTES
1. As this article was being written, 26 of
the 51 states currently had some type of
statewide youth services association.
The other 25 states had no statewide
functioning association (Interview with
Caroline roft, Director, Runaway Youth
Program, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, April 1983). Those
states with currently active statewide
associations are: Ark., Calif., Col.,
Conn., Fla., Ha., Ill., Ind., Ia., Mi.,
Mo, N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Oh., Okla.,
Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Vt.,
Wash., and Wis.
2. In the summer of 1981, 28 youth services
4676-
programs in the state of Michigan were
sent a mailed questionnaire asking foe,
information on the impacts of budget cuts
on their programs. Twenty-four programs
responded. Complete results are obtain-
able from the author.
3. This catagorization of the literature was
developed independently by the author,
It was derived by looking at all the
political advocacy literature and then
evaluating the extent to which this
literature was based more on research
than anecdotal or dogmatic accounts.
4. These are my interpretations of their
findings. I have abstracted the major
generalizations as I see them.
5. This is my independent judgment given the
activities over the last two years. It
is based on participant observation,
informal interviews, and a reading of the
public record.o
* The author would like to thank Barry
Checkoway, Ann Hartmilen, Jack Rothman and John
Tropman, The University of Michigan, for
commenting on an earlier version of this
paper.
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